Opinion: Limits on direct democracy, Round 3
Once again, the Colorado
Legislature has taken up the job of amending the Colorado Constitution to make
it more difficult for others to do the same. The current proposal, Senate
Continuing Resolution-001, has many similarities with other recent attempts,
including Referendum A (1996) and Referendum O (2008). Unfortunately, the
Legislature is acting with tone-deafness to Colorado citizens` desire for
direct democracy, and without adequate consideration of the effects of the
proposed changes. So I expect that, once again, the proposal will lose at the ballot
box.
This particular attempt to
take power away from the citizens is apparently in response to complaints by
opponents of the 2010 Amendments 60, 61, and Proposition 101 that they had to
spend money to defeat these proposals. While I agree that these proposals were
ill-conceived and dangerous, part of democracy is fighting bad ideas.
Currently, citizens can
initiate legislation by gathering signatures to put either a statute or
constitutional amendment on the ballot. The basic difference between the statutory
and constitutional amendment approaches is that currently the Legislature can
revise or void a citizen initiated statue by a simple majority vote in both the
Senate and the House, but a constitutional amendment can only be changed or
repealed by another citizen vote. Since citizens generally initiate legislation
because the Legislature has failed to act, the current system for initiated
statutes requires citizens to trust that legislators will not undercut their
efforts, and so lacks much appeal.
The Legislature is now
proposing to grant a very small increase in additional protection to citizen
initiated statutes — for three years after the statute takes effect, any change
or repeal would require a two-thirds vote of each house (Senate version) or a
60 percent vote (House version). As a tradeoff for granting this minimal
additional protection, the Legislature wants to make it much more difficult for
citizens to undertake constitutional amendments.
First, for citizens to do
a constitutional amendment under SCR-001, a significant number of signatures
would have to be gathered in each of Colorado`s seven congressional districts,
not just statewide as currently. This is obviously more onerous, but, worse, it
could lead to seven separate concurrent challenges to the adequacy of the
signatures, a significant burden for anyone without huge financial resources.
But the Legislature could still put amendments on the ballot by two-thirds
votes, so its relative power is increased.
Second, the overall
requirement for passage of a constitutional amendment would be 60 percent of
the popular vote, with the exception of simple repeals (in whole or in part) of
amendments passed prior to 2013. This exception is obviously focused at making
it easier to repeal TABOR and Amendment 23. But in order to appeal to many
voters, amendments to either of these must have some give and take, and not
just be partial or complete repeals. Thus, the net effect may be that neither
TABOR and nor Amendment 23 is ever amended.
SCR-001 also has some
inconsistencies. As I said, SCR-001 requires only a simple majority vote to
repeal any constitutional amendment passed before 2013. The obvious logic is
that if something passed by majority, it can be repealed by majority. But
SCR-001 itself is exempted from this – it could pass by 50-plus percent, but to
repeal or change it would require 60-plus percent. Also, if SCR-001 passes,
proponents of constitutional amendments will have to gather a significant
number of signatures in all congressional districts, but could actually win
with an overwhelming vote in only a few.
The Legislature reacted to
the 1992 passage of TABOR (which it could have prevented by proposing a simple
“no tax increase without a vote” amendment) by supporting and getting passed a
single-subject requirement for future constitutional amendments. This may come
back to haunt them, as SCR-001 arguably has two subjects, the constitutional
amendment process itself, and the legislative voting process to change
initiated statutes.
Is there a better way to
limit constitutional amendments? I suggest that the Legislature start by
abandoning this particular effort, and simply provide better protection for
citizen-initiated statutes. For example, they could propose that for the first,
say, 12 years after passage, initiated statutes would require a two-thirds
majority of both houses to be changed. This would provide good protection but
allow technical fixes that most legislators support. And, perhaps more to the
point, it might actually pass.