Opinion: Don’t do flood planning using the rear view mirror
Back almost 30 years ago,
when I was on the City Council, we engaged in a very detailed study of the
major drainages that flow through Boulder, and the likely damage that could
result from floods. Our objective was to come up with appropriate risk
mitigation standards. Council member Spense Havlick and I even went to CSU and
tried to walk across their artificial flume at various flow rates and depths to
test our ability to walk through a flood.
Out of this study came
Boulder’s regulatory standard using the 100-year and 500-year flood maps and
also the high hazard areas, which were based on such flows. The “100 year
flood” is a statistical notion that uses historical data to attempt to indicate
what areas would have a 1 percent probability of flooding in a given year. The
“500 year flood” has an annual probability of 0.2 percent.
Setting the rules based on
these standards was a compromise. The council did end up requiring some
buildings that were at very serious risk to be torn down. But buildings in
areas at somewhat lower risk were left in place, even though they never should
have been built in the first place. This was to avoid removing vast numbers of
existing buildings.
The current regulations
need some serious updating. First, they are not appropriate for areas where
development can be avoided; they were created for already-developed areas, and
so compromise the level of protection. Second, the frequency/intensity
forecasts are really just educated guesses because the historic events are so
infrequent, so they form a weak basis for doing quantitative risk assessment.
Third, and critically important, the climate is changing, so we can expect more
and more intense flood events.
We had such a flood in September 2013, when
a slow-moving weather pattern essentially stalled over our area, dropping heavy
rain for four days straight. Some weather scientists said this was a result of
“arctic blocking” — the warming in the Arctic is reducing the rate of
circulation of weather patterns and increasing their intensity. Many of us have
noticed the more extended spells of warm, cold, clear, or rainy weather.
The result of extended
rainstorms is that the ground becomes saturated. After that, the rain falls on
an essentially impervious surface and just runs off. We saw that in my
neighborhood near King’s Gulch, where I have lived for over 40 years. I have
never seen water run more than maybe a foot deep, even in intense
thunderstorms. But in September 2013 it was running over three feet deep and
over six feet wide. The result was that many houses in the neighborhood were
flooded as the water ran over the streets and into yards and basements. And
King’s Gulch has a tiny watershed compared to many.
The big flood issue that
Boulder now faces is how to mitigate the risks of South Boulder Creek and the
proposed CU South development. Rather than planning by looking in the rear view
mirror and using regulations that are both out of date and inappropriate for
the situation, the city and CU should plan for “reasonable worst case”
scenarios. For example, what would happen if an extended, strong, multi-day
rainstorm were to fall in the foothills upstream of Colo. 93 when the South
Boulder Creek is already full with snowmelt and is overrunning the Gross
Reservoir dam? (The “unreasonable worst case” is all the above, plus having
Gross Dam fail!)
Given multiple days of
flood level flows, the detention pond behind the proposed berm would fill up
pretty quickly, and the city would be faced with making an unpleasant choice:
Do we let more water spill out so that the areas downstream flood now, or do we
just hope that even more intense rain later will not cause the levee to be
overtopped and create a major disaster? Let’s not forget the Oroville Dam
scenario — a supposedly well-engineered dam was at risk of failure, because
heavy rains forced the California Department of Water Resources to release a
lot of water that eroded the spillway and forced the evacuation of over 188,000
people. And this dam was inspected both by the FERC and the CDWR. Apparently,
being checked by a regulatory agency is no guarantee.
The solution is to use the
principles, not the regulations, from 30 years ago — don’t try to dam up the
river, create ways for the floodwater to safely flow through while minimizing
structural solutions, and keep new development well out of harm’s way.